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Abstract. We study parameterized verification problems for networks of interacting register au-
tomata. The network is represented through a graph, and processes may exchange broadcast mes-
sages containing data with their neighbours. Upon reception a process can either ignore a sent value,
test for equality with a value stored in a register, or simply store the value in a register. We consider
safety properties expressed in terms of reachability, from arbitrarily large initial configurations, of a
configuration exposing some given control states and patterns. We investigate, in this context, the
impact on decidability and complexity of the number of local registers, the number of values carried
by a single message, and dynamic reconfigurations of the underlying network.
1. Introduction
Distribution is at the core of modern computer applications. They usually involve partially synchronized
entities, use different communication means, and manipulate data like identifiers and time-stamps. For
all these reasons, distributed algorithms are a challenging test-case for automated verification methods
[24]. Several examples of distributed algorithms are based on the assumption that individual processes
follow the same protocol. Methods like model checking are not always directly applicable to this class of
algorithms. Indeed, they normally require to fix the initial system configuration or the maximum number
of components.
One way to validate distributed algorithms parametric in the number of involved agents consists in
searching for finite model properties, e.g., cut-off values for the parameters. In their seminal paper [22],
German and Sistla propose a model where each entity in the system executes the same finite state pro-
tocol and where the communication is achieved via rendez-vous communication. They exhibit cut-off
properties for finding a minimal number of entities that expose a violation to a given property. They
also rely on the idea that in such systems, one does not need to know precisely the state of each process,
but that it is enough to count the number of processes in each state, this idea is known as the counting
abstraction. These ideas have then been extended to other parameterized systems with different char-
acteristics: for instance, in [17] and [19] Emerson and Namjoshi and Esparza et al. propose the model
of broadcast protocols which extends the model in [22] by allowing the entities to communicate either
via rendez-vous or via broadcast. In the broadcast operation all the entities that can react to a message
have to react. To decide coverability, the authors apply the theory of well-structured transition systems
[1, 21] formulated on the counting abstraction of the considered model. Constraint-based methods for the
analysis of broadcast protocols have been considered in [10]. In a recent paper [20], Esparza and Ganty
introduce a parameterized model in which communication is achieved via a finite set of shared variables
storing finite domain values. In [18], Esparza presents a survey of some of the main results for the above
mentioned parameterized models. Parameterized verification of systems composed by repeated compo-
nents have also been proposed by considering different means of communication as token-passing [5, 9],
message passing [7], or rendez-vous over an infinite domain of data in [11].
introduced in [19, 22], Delzanno et al. propose in [15] a model of ad-hoc networks based on the
following consideration: communication in ad-hoc networks is often based on broadcast, but only the
entities in the transmission range can receive emitted messages. For this reason, they propose a simple
parameterized model, that we will refer to as AHN (for Ad Hoc Network), where each system node
executes the same protocol define by a finite state automaton labeled with broadcast and reception ac-
tions. Configuration are equipped with a communication topology (defined as a graph). In this model
broadcast messages belong to a finite alphabet. The verification problems consists then in asking whether
there exists a number of entities and a communication topology such that an execution of the protocol
exhibits some anomalies. For this model, they prove that coverability (or reachability of a configuration
exhibiting a bad control state) is undecidable [15]. Decidability can be regained by restricting the class
of allowed topologies, e.g., by considering bounded path communication topologies (in which the length
of the longest simple path is bounded) [15], or clique graphs [16] where broadcast messages are received
by all the nodes in the networks, or a mix of these two notions [16]. Decidability results can also be ob-
tained with mobility or non-deterministic reconfiguration of the communication topology at any moment
[15]. In reconfigurable AHNs a node may disconnect from its neighbors and connect to other ones at any
time during a computation. This behavior models in a natural way unexpected power-off and dynamic
movement of devices. For the latter restriction, it has been proved that checking the reachability of a
configuration where some control states are present can be done in polynomial time [14]. Furthermore,
testing for the absence of some control state in a configuration to be reached renders the problem NP-
complete [14]. We point out the fact that the model of AHN with fully connected topologies (or clique
communication topologies) is equivalent to the model of broadcast protocols introduced in [19] without
rendez-vous communication. The model of AHN has also been extended in different ways: considering
finite protocols equipped with independent clocks à la timed automata [4] evolving at the same rate [2],
or finite protocols with probabilities [6].
In this paper we study an extension of the model of AHN with reconfiguration originally introduce
in [15] and studied more deeply in [14] where we consider that the messages that are broadcast belong
now to an infinite alphabet. We assume furthermore that each node in the network is equipped with a
finite set of registers. The resulting model called Broadcast Networks of Register Automata (BNRA) is
aimed at modeling both the local knowledge of distributed nodes as well as their interaction via broadcast
communication. As in AHN, a network is modeled via a finite graph where each node runs an instance of
a common protocol. A protocol is specified via a register automaton, an automaton equipped with a finite
set of registers [23], where each register assumes values taken from the set of natural numbers. Node
interaction is specified via broadcast communication where messages are allowed to carry data, that can
be assigned to or tested against the local registers of receivers. The resulting model can be used to reason
about core parts of client-server protocols as well as of routing protocols, e.g. route maintenance as
in Link Reversal Routing. We focus our attention on the decidability and complexity of parameterized
verification of safety properties, i.e., the problem of finding a sufficient number of nodes and an initial
topology that may lead to a configuration exposing a bad pattern. The considered class of verification
problems is parametric in four dimensions: the number of nodes, the topology of the initial configuration
to be discovered, and the amounts of data contained in local registers and exchanged messages. The
peculiarity of our model is that messages are now data from an infinite domain and that interaction is
restricted according to an underlying communication graph. Distributed algorithms often manipulate
data belonging to an infinite domain such as identifiers of the agents of the network.
In our analysis we study the decidability status of some coverability problem for this model taking
into account the number of registers of individual nodes and the number of fields in the messages. For
messages with no data field (and hence no register as well in the nodes), our model boils down to AHN,
and we know that the coverability problem is undecidable for arbitrary topologies without reconfigura-
tion, while decidability is regained for fully connected and bounded-path topologies or by taking into
account reconfiguration [15, 16]. We study here whether these last decidability results still hold when
extending the protocols with registers over infinite data value and fields in the messages. We draw the
following decidability frontier.
• When reconfiguration is allowed, we show that:
– The coverability problem is undecidable if nodes have at least two registers and messages
have at least two fields.
– If we restrict the number of data fields in the messages to be less than or equal to one, we
regain decidability (without any bound on the number of allowed registers). The decision
algorithm is based on a saturation procedure that operates on a graph-based symbolic repre-
sentation of sets of configurations in which the data are abstracted away. This representation
uses the relations between data (equality, inequality) and is inspired by similar techniques
used in the case of classical register automata [23]. We prove that in this case the problem is
PSPACE-complete.
• For fully connected topologies without reconfiguration, we have that:
– The coverability problem is undecidable when nodes are equipped with at least two registers
and messages with at least one field;
– On the other hand if we restrict the number of register to be less than or equal to one and the
number of data field per message to be also less than or equal to one, then the coverability
problem becomes decidable. The decidability proof exploits the theory of well-structured
transition systems [3, 21]. We obtain as well a non-elementary lower bound which follows
from a reduction from coverability in reset nets [28].
This paper corresponds to a completed version of [12].
2. Broadcast Networks of Register Automata
2.1. Syntax and semantics
We model a distributed network using a graph in which the behavior of each node is described via an
automaton with operations over a finite set of registers. A node can transmit part of its current data
to adjacent nodes using broadcast messages. A message carries both a type and a finite tuple of data.
Receivers can test/store/ignore the data contained inside a message. We assume that broadcasts and
receptions are executed without delays (i.e. we simultaneously update the state of sender and receiver
nodes).
Actions Let us first describe the set of actions. We use r ≥ 0 to denote the number of registers in each
node. We use f ≥ 0 to denote the number of data fields available in each message and we consider a
finite alphabet Σ of message types. We often use [i..j] to denote the set {k ∈ N | i ≤ k ≤ j}. We also
assume that if r = 0 then f = 0 (no registers, no information to transmit). The set of broadcast actions
parameterized by r, f and Σ is defined follows:
Send
r,f
Σ = {b(m, p1, . . . , pf ) | m ∈ Σ and pi ∈ [1..r] for i ∈ [1..f ]}
The action b(a, p1, . . . , pf ) corresponds to a broadcast message of type a whose i-th field contains the
value of the pi-th register of the sending node. For instance, for r = 2 and f = 4, b(req, 1, 1, 2, 1)
corresponds to a message of type req in which the current value of the register 1 of the sender is copied
in the first two fields and in the last field, and the current value of register 2 of the sender is copied into
the third field.
A receiver node can then either compare the value of a message field against the current value of
a register, store the value of a message field in a register, or simply ignore a message field. Reception











m ∈ Σ, αi ∈ Act
r for i ∈ [1..f ]
and if αi = αj = ↓k then i = j
}
where the set of field actions Actr is: {?k, ?k, ↓k, ∗ | k ∈ [1..r]}. When used in a given position of a
reception action, ?k [resp. ?k] tests whether the content of the k-th register is equal [resp. different] to
the corresponding value of the message, ↓k is used to store the corresponding value of the message into
the k-th register, and ∗ is used to denote that the corresponding value is ignored.
As an example, for r = 2 and f = 4, r(req, ?2, ?1, ∗, ↓1) specifies the reception of a message of
type req in which the first field is tested for inequality against the current value of the second register, the
second field is tested for equality against the first register, the third field is ignored, and the fourth field
is assigned to the first register. We now provide the definition of a protocol that models the behavior of
an individual node.
Definition 2.1. A (r, f)-protocol over Σ is a tuple P = 〈Q,R, q0〉 where: Q is a finite set of control




Σ ) × Q is a set of broadcasting
and reception rules.
In the rest of the paper we call a (r, f)-protocol over Σ simply a (r, f)-protocol when the alphabet is
clear from the context.
A configuration is a graph in which nodes represent the current state of the corresponding protocol
instance running on it (control state and current value of registers) and edges denote communication
links. In this paper we assume that the value of registers are naturals. Therefore, a valuation of registers
is defined as a map from register positions to naturals. More formally, a configuration γ of a (r, f)-
protocol P = 〈Q,R, q0〉 is an undirected graph 〈V,E, L〉 such that V is a finite set of nodes, E ⊆
V ×V \{(v, v) | v ∈ V } is a set of edges, and L : V → Q× Nr is a labeling function (current valuation
of registers).
Before we give the semantics of our model, we introduce some auxiliary notations. Let γ = 〈V,E, L〉
be a configuration. For a node v ∈ V , we denote by LQ(v) and LM (v) the first and second projection
of L(v). For u, v ∈ V , we write u ∼γ v – or simply u ∼ v when γ is clear from the context –
the fact that (u, v) ∈ E, i.e. the two nodes are neighbors. Finally, the configuration γ is said to be
initial if LQ(v) = q0 for all v ∈ V and, for all u, v ∈ V and all i, j ∈ [1..r], if u 6= v or i 6= j
then LM (v)[i] 6= LM (v)[j]. Consequently in an initial configuration, all the registers of the nodes
contain different values. Note that we could have consider a different semantics with no restriction on
the contents of the registers in the initial configurations. We comment this point in the conclusion section.
We write Γ [resp. Γ0] for the set of all [resp. initial] configurations, and Γ
fc [resp. Γfc0 ] for the set
of configurations [resp. initial configurations] 〈V,E, L〉 that are fully connected, i.e. such that E =
V × V \ {(v, v) | v ∈ V }. Note that for a given (r, f)-protocol the sets Γ, Γ0, Γ
fc , and Γfc0 are infinite
since we do not impose any restriction on the number of processes present in the graph.
Furthermore, from two nodes u and v of a configuration γ = 〈V,E, L〉 and a broadcast action
of the form b(m, p1, . . . , pf ), let R(v, u,b(m, p1, . . . , pf )) ⊆ Q × N
r be the set of the possible la-
bels that can take u on reception of the corresponding message sent by v, i.e. we have (q′r,M) ∈
R(v, u,b(m, p1, . . . , pf )) if and only if there exists a receive action of the form 〈LQ(u), r(m,α1, . . . , αf ),
q′r〉 ∈ R verifying the two following conditions:
(1) For all i ∈ [1..f ], if there exists j ∈ [1..r] s.t. αi = ?j [resp. αi = ?j], then LM (u)[j] =
LM (v)[pi] [resp. LM (u)[j] 6= LM (v)[pi]];
(2) For all j ∈ [1..r], if there exists i ∈ [1..f ] such that αi = ↓j then M [j] = LM (v)[pi] otherwise
M [j] = LM (u)[j].
Given a (r, f)-protocol P = 〈Q,R, q0〉, we define a Broadcast Network of Register Automata
(BNRA) as the transition system BNRA(P) = 〈Γ,⇒,Γ0〉 where Γ [resp. Γ0] is the set of all [resp.
initial] configurations and ⇒⊆ Γ× Γ is the transition relation defined as follows: for γ = 〈V,E, L〉 and
γ′ = 〈V ′, E′, L′〉 ∈ Γ, we have γ ⇒ γ′ if and only if V = V ′ and one of the following conditions holds:
(Broadcast) E = E′ and there exist v ∈ V and 〈q,b(m, p1, . . . , pf ), q
′〉 ∈ R such that LQ(v) = q,
L′Q(v) = q
′ and for all u ∈ V \ {v}:
• if u ∼ v then L′(u) ∈ R(v, u,b(m, p1, . . . , pf )), or, R(v, u,b(m, p1, . . . , pf )) = ∅ and
L(u) = L′(u);
• if u ≁ v, then L(u) = L′(u).
(Reconfiguration) L = L′ (no constraint on new edges E′).
Reconfiguration steps model dynamic changes of the connection topology, e.g., loss of links and mes-
sages or node movement. An internal transition τ can be defined using a broadcast of a special message
such that there are no reception rules associated to it. A register j ∈ [1..r] is said to be read-only if and
only if there is no 〈q, r(m,α1, . . . , αf ), q
′〉 ∈ R and i ∈ [1..f ] such that αi = ↓j. Read-only registers
can be used as identifiers of the associated nodes.
Given BNRA(P) = 〈Γ,⇒,Γ0〉, we use ⇒b to denote the restriction of ⇒ to broadcast steps only,
and ⇒∗ [resp. ⇒∗b ] to denote the reflexive and transitive closure of ⇒ [resp. ⇒b]. Now we define the set
of reachable configurations as: Reach(P) = {γ′ ∈ Γ | ∃γ ∈ Γ0 s.t. γ ⇒
∗ γ′}, Reachb(P) = {γ′ ∈ Γ |
∃γ ∈ Γ0 s.t. γ ⇒
∗
b γ
′}, and Reach fc(P) = Reachb(P) ∩ Γfc.
2.2. Coverability Problem
Our goal is to decide whether there exists an initial configuration (of any size and topology) from which
it is possible to reach a configuration exposing (covered by with respect to graph inclusion) a bad pattern.
We express bad patterns using reachability queries defined as follows. Let P = 〈Q,R, q0〉 be a (r, f)-
protocol and Z a denumerable set of variables. A reachability query ϕ for P is a formula generated by
the following grammar:
ϕ ::= q(z) | Mi(z) = Mj(z
′) | Mi(z) 6= Mj(z
′) | ϕ ∧ ϕ
where z, z′ ∈ Z, q ∈ Q and i, j ∈ [1..r]. We now define the satisfiability relation for such queries. Given
a configuration γ = 〈V,E, L〉 ∈ Γ, a valuation is a function g : Z 7→ V . The satisfaction relation |= is
parameterized by a valuation and is defined inductively as follows:
• γ |=g q(z) if and only if LQ(g(z)) = q,
• γ |=g Mi(z) = Mj(z
′) if and only if LM (g(z))[i] = LM (g(z
′))[j],
• γ |=g Mi(z) 6= Mj(z
′) if and only if LM (g(z))[i] 6= LM (g(z
′))[j],
• γ |=g ϕ ∧ ϕ
′ if and only if γ |=g ϕ and γ |=g ϕ
′.
We say that a configuration γ satisfies a reachability query ϕ, denoted by γ |= ϕ if and only if there exists
a valuation g such that γ |=g ϕ. Furthermore we assume that our queries do not contain contradictions
with respect to = and 6=. This query language mediates between expressiveness and simplicity, enabling
us to search for graph patterns involving both control states and register values. We can now provide the
definition of the parameterized coverability problem, which consists in finding an initial configuration
that leads to a configuration containing in which the query can be matched.
Definition 2.2. The problem Cov(r, f) is defined as follows: given a (r, f)-protocol P and a reachabil-
ity query ϕ, does there exist γ ∈ Reach(P) such that γ |= ϕ?
The problem Cov b(r, f) [resp. Cov fc(r, f)] is obtained by replacing the reachability set with Reachb(P)
[resp. Reach fc(P)]. Finally, Cov(∗, f) denotes the disjunction of the problems Cov(r, f) varying on
r ≥ 0 (i.e. for any (finite) number of registers).
Note that these problems belong to the class of coverability problem since we seek a configura-
tion which “covers” the query, in other words a configuration which contains a subpart respecting a
reachability query. Furthermore in our context, strict reachability problems, where one asks whether a
configuration is reachable, are easier to solve, since when we fix a final configuration we know the num-
ber of nodes present in all the previous configurations (since during an execution this number does not
change) and hence the problem boils down to the verification of a finite state system.
For the cases with no register (r = 0) and hence no information to transmit (f = 0), the problems
have already been studied previously. More precisely it has been shown that Cov b(0, 0) is undecidable
[15] and that Cov fc(0, 0) is decidable [16, 19] and Ackermann-complete [27] and that Cov(0, 0) [14]
can be solved in polynomial time.
3. An Example: Route Discovery Protocol
We describe here the behavior of our model on an example Consider the problem of building a route
from nodes of type sender to nodes of type dest. We assume that nodes are equipped with two registers,
called id and next, used to store a pointer to the next node in the route to dest. The protocol that collects
such information is defined in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Route discovery example
adjacent nodes in search for a valid neighbor. Back edges are used to restart the protocol in case of loss
of intermediate messages or no reply at all. An instance of the protocol starts with a node in state sender
broadcasts a route request rreq, attaching his identifier to the message, and waits. Intermediate nodes in
state idle react to it by forwarding another rreq with their identifier, and then they wait too for a reply.
The protocol goes on until an rreq message finally reaches a destination, a node in state dest, which
replies by providing its identifier with an rrep message to its vicinity. All of the intermediate nodes
involved save in the local register next the value from the rrep message, and send another rrep message
with their identifier to the neighbors, to notify them that they are on the route to reach the destination.
When an rrep message arrives to the sender, it saves the identifier of the next hop and the route is
established.
In this example an undesired state is, e.g., any configuration in which two adjacent nodes n and n′
point to each other. Bad patterns like this one can be specified using a query like ready(z1)∧ready(z2)∧
Mid(z1) = Mnext(z2) ∧Mnext(z1) = Mid(z2).
Note that in this work we are mainly interested in safety properties, or more precisely, properties
that can be checked thanks to reachability queries. On this example, another interesting property could
be to check whether the protocol builds eventually a route from sender to dest. Such a property would
involved a more complex reasoning than the one we currently propose and it will be hence more difficult
to tackle.
4. Reconfiguration in Arbitrary Graphs
4.1. Undecidability of Cov(2, 2)
Our first result is the undecidability of coverability for nodes with two registers (one read-only) and
messages with two data fields. The proof is based on a reduction from reachability in two counter
machines. The reduction builds upon an election protocol that can be applied to select a linked list (of
arbitrary length) of nodes in the network. The existence of such a list-builder protocol is at the core of
the proof. The simulation of a two counter machine becomes easy once a list has been constructed. In
this section, we assume that protocols have at least one read-only register id ∈ [1..r]. We formalize next
the notion of list and list-builder that we use in the undecidability proofs presented across the paper.
We first say that a node v points to a node v′ via x if the register x of v contains the same value as
register id of v′. We consider a configuration γ = 〈V,E, L〉 ∈ Γ with LQ(v) ⊆ Q for all v ∈ V . For
a set of states Q and pairwise disjoint sets Qa, Qb, Qc ⊂ Q, we say that γ contains a 〈Qa, Qb, Qc〉-list
(linked via x), or simply list, starting at v if there exists a set of nodes {v1, · · · , vk} ⊆ V such that
LQ(v1) ∈ Qa, LQ(vk) ∈ Qc, and LQ(vi) ∈ Qb for i ∈ [2..k− 1], and furthermore vj is the unique node
in V that points to vj+1 via x and has label in Qa ∪ Qb for j ∈ [0..k − 1]. In other words sets Qa and
Qc are sentinels for a list made of nodes with label in Qb. A backward list is defined as before but with
reversed pointers, i.e., vj+1 points to vj and we say that the list ends at v.
We often write 〈qa, qb, qc〉-list as a shorthand for a 〈{qa}, {qb}, {qc}〉-list. For a transition relation
 ∈ {⇒,⇒b}, Γ
′ ⊆ Γ and γ ∈ Γ, Γ′  ∗ γ is true iff there exists γ′ ∈ Γ′ s.t. γ′  ∗ γ. We now state the
definition of list builders.
Definition 4.1. A protocol P = 〈Q,R, q0〉 is a forward [resp. backward] 〈qa, qb, qc〉-list builder for a
transition relation  ∈ {⇒,⇒b} and Γ
′
0 ⊆ Γ0 on x ∈ [1..r] if, for any γ = 〈V,E, L〉 ∈ Γ and every
v ∈ V such that Γ′0  
∗ γ and LQ(v) = qa, we have that γ contains a 〈qa, qb, qc〉-list [resp. 〈qc, qb, qa〉-
list] linked via x starting at v [resp. ending at v]. Furthermore, if is ⇒b, then v
′ ∼ v′′ for all successive
nodes v′ and v′′ in the list.
We will now see how we can exploit the list (of arbitrary length) generated by a list-builder protocol
to build a simulation of a two counter machine. Indeed, notice that if node v is the only one pointing to
node v′ then the pair of actions b(m,x) and r(m, ?id) can be used to send a message from v to v′ (v′ is
the only node that can receive m from v). Furthermore, the pair of actions b(m, id) and r(m, ?x) can be
used to send a message from v′ to v (v is the only node that can receive m from v′). This property can
be exploited to simulate counters by using intermediate nodes as single units (the value of the counter is
the sum of unit nodes in the list). One of the sentinels is used as program location, and the links in the
list are used to send messages (in two directions) to adjacent nodes to increment or decrement (update of
labels) the counters. Test for zero is encoded by a double traversal of the list in order to check that each
intermediate node represents zero units.
Let Ql be the set {qa, qb, qc}. We say that a forward or backward 〈qa, qb, qc〉-list builder protocol
Plb = 〈Qlb, Rlb, q0〉 is extended with new states Q
′ and rules R′ when the resulting protocol P =
〈Q,R, q0〉 first executes Plb reaching a state in Ql, and then continues only in states in Q
′ by firing
only rules in R′ which preserve lists and cannot interfere with the Plb sub-protocol. More formally,
we require that Q = Qlb ∪ Q
′, Qlb ∩ Q
′ = Ql, R = Rlb ∪ R
′, and each rule in R′ cannot involve:
messages m ∈ Σ that appear in some rule of Rlb; states in Qlb \ Ql; or store operations overwriting
register x. Furthermore, there is a partitioning Qa, Qb, and Qc of Q
′ such that qa ∈ Qa, qb ∈ Qb,
qc ∈ Qc, and every rule in R
′ does not involve states belonging to different partitions. Thanks to all these
conditions, while executing P , 〈qa, qb, qc〉-lists may evolve into 〈Qa, Qb, Qc〉-lists while maintaining the
original underlying structure. Then (e.g., with f = 1 and forward list builders), a message m ∈ Σ can
be propagated from a node vi of the list v1 · · · vk ∈ V to the next vi+1 by broadcasting b(m,x) and
receiving r(m, ?id). Indeed, because of the property of lists, vi is the only node in the network which
can possibly execute the broadcast from some state in Q′ and, at the same time, having its register x set
to vi+1. At the same time, vi+1 is the only node in the network in some state in Q
′ with the reception
rule possibly enabled, because the read-only register id uniquely identifies it. For the same reasons, m
can be propagated backward from vi+1 to vi by broadcasting b(m, id) and receiving r(m, ?x).
Lemma 4.1. For r ≥ 2 and f ≥ 1, Cov(r, f) [resp. Cov b(r, f)] restricted to initial configurations
Γ′0 ⊆ Γ0 is undecidable if there exists a forward or backward list builder (r, f)-protocol for ⇒ [resp.
⇒b] and Γ
′
0 ⊆ Γ0 on x ∈ [1..r] that can generate lists of arbitrary finite length.
Proof:
We show that, under the assumptions of the Lemma, the following reduction from the halting problem
for two-counter machines to Cov b(r, f) is correct. Then, to prove the Cov(r, f) case, we will show that
the reduction also works with ⇒. We provide the reduction only for the case of forward list builders: in
case of backward ones it is sufficient to swap the patterns to communicate back and forth in the linked
list. Indeed, the only change to be dealt with would be the direction of the links kept in register x of each
node.
First we recall the definition of a a two-counter machine; it is machine M = 〈Loc, Inst, ℓ0〉 where
Loc is a finite set of location, ℓ0 ∈ Loc is an initial location and Inst is a finite set of instructions
manipulating two variables c1 and c2 which take their value in the natural numbers (aka counters), each
rule being of the following form: increment of counter ci (ℓ, ci++, ℓ
′), decrement of counter ci
(ℓ, ci−−, ℓ
′) and zero-test of counter ci (ℓ, ci == 0, ℓ
′) with ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ Loc. In such a machine, the
counters can never take negative values. We do not recall the semantics of such machine which is quite
natural. The reachability problem for a two counter machine M and a location ℓ ∈ Loc consists in
determining whether such a machine starting in ℓ0 with 0 as counter values can reach the location ℓ by
executing the instructions. This problem is known to be undecidable [26].
Let Plb = 〈Qlb, Rlb, q0〉 be a forward 〈qh, qz, qt〉-list builder for ⇒b and Γ
′
0 ⊆ Γ0 on x ∈ [1..r] and
with a read-only register id ∈ [1..r], and let M = 〈Loc, Inst, ℓ0〉 be a two-counter machine. We extend
Plb to obtain protocol P = 〈Q,R, q0〉 as an encoding of M. Each location ℓ ∈ Loc \ {ℓ0} and each
instruction i ∈ Inst are mapped respectively to a state P(ℓ) ∈ Q \ Qlb and to a set of new auxiliary
states q ∈ Q \Qlb and rules r ∈ R \Rlb. The initial location ℓ0 is mapped into P(ℓ0) = qh, because, by
Definition 4.1, as soon as a node labelled qh appears its corresponding list is ready. Counters are encoded
in unary through individual processes: each process in state qz represents a zero and it may change state
in order to represent a unit of one counter (qc1) or another (qc2). The encoded instructions work by



















Figure 2. Increment of counter c1
It is worth noting that, since Plb may build more than one list, at a given point we may have sev-
eral ongoing simulations of M. However, by following the point to point communication patterns
previously described we ensure they are independent of each other. Figure 2 shows how increments
(ℓ, c++, ℓ′) ∈ Inst are encoded. The head node, in state P(ℓ), sends an increment order incc and waits
for an acknowledgement reply incrc before moving to the encoding of the next state, P(ℓ
′). The message
is propagated through the list, until either it reaches the first process in state qz , which goes to state qc
and replies back, or it reaches the tail qt, which ignores it leading the head node to a deadlock (meaning
the processes in the list were not enough to keep count of c1 and c2). A decrement instruction can be
encoded by following the same pattern as for increments. Tests (ℓ, c == 0, ℓ′) ∈ Inst are encoded in
a similar way, but in this case the reply with the acknowledgement tzrc can be sent only by the tail node
qt. The nodes in state qc representing units of the currently tested counter do not propagate the message,
therefore the message tzc travels through the whole list and reaches the tail if and only if there are no qc
nodes, i.e. when c = 0.
When considering reconfigurations, i.e. when the transition relation is ⇒, all of the previous assump-
tions still hold, except for the fact that, when sending a message from a node in the list to its successor,
we no longer know if the two of them are neighbors. Otherwise said, with ⇒ we may lose messages,
and the computation would block as soon as this happens. This is not a problem for the reduction how-
ever, because we know that an execution with reconfigurations such that no messages are lost still exists.
Indeed, when encoding the reachability problem for M and ℓ ∈ Loc with Cov(r, f) for P and P(ℓ),
blocked executions do not represent an obstacle, since the parameterized coverability problem is satisfied
by the existence of an execution that leads to the target state. ⊓⊔
The previous lemma tells us that to prove undecidability of the parameterized coverability problem
we just have to exhibit a list-builder protocol. In the case of Cov(2, 2), we apply Lemma 4.1, by showing
that protocol Plb of Figure 4 is a backward list-builder for qh, qz , and qt on x ∈ [1..r]. The rationale is


















Figure 3. Testing for zero counter c1
point from each node to the previous one, up to the head v1, in state qh. Any node in the initial state q0
(e.g., v1) may decide to become a tail by starting to build its own list. Every such construction activity,
however, is guaranteed not to interfere in any way with the others, thanks to point to point communication
between nodes simulated on top of network reconfigurations and broadcast by exploiting the two payload
fields. This is achieved via a three-way handshake where the first and second fields respectively identify
the sender and the recipient. When the sub-protocol is done, v1 moves to state qt, v2 moves to the
intermediate state qi, and one points to the other. Node v2 decides whether to stop building the list by
becoming the head qh, or to continue by executing another handshake to elect node v3. The process





b(s, id, id) r(a, ↓x, ?id) b(sa, id, x)
r(s, ↓x, ∗) b(a, id, x) r(sa, ?x, ?id) τ
b(s, id, id)
r(a, ↓x, ?id)b(sa, id, x)
Figure 4. Plb: backward list-builder for qh, qz , qt, and Γ0 on x
Theorem 4.1. Cov(2, 2) is undecidable even when restricting one register to be read-only.
Proof:
Let us consider protocol Plb of Figure 4. We now prove that Plb is a backward list builder for qh, qz , qt
and Γ0 on x ∈ [1..r].
Let γ = 〈V,E, L〉 ∈ Γ be a configuration. It is not fundamental that γ ∈ Γ0, because the protocol
may elect multiple lists. The only requirement is to have at least some nodes still in the initial state
q0, and this is trivially satisfied by every γ0 ∈ Γ0. A node vi ∈ V wishing to establish a connection
with vi+1 ∈ V broadcasts its identifier with a request b(s, id, id), either from q0 or qi (the paths from
those two states to respectively qt and qz are labelled by the same actions). Its current neighbors in state
q0 store the identifier of vi by firing r(s, ↓x, ∗). The first vi+1 of them that answers b(a, id, x) gets
its own identifier stored by vi with the reception rule r(a, ↓x, ?id) (provided reconfigurations did not
disconnect it, otherwise the message is lost and the protocol stops). The winner, vi+1, is notified by vi
with a confirmation message b(sa, id, x). Only vi+1 will be able to react to such a message, because it
is the only node in the network for which the guard ?id in r(sa, ?x, ?id) is satisfied. At this point, node
vi which started the communication from q0 or qi is respectively in qt or qz . Node vi+1 is necessarily in
the intermediate state qi instead, as the (temporarily) latest elected node of the list. Its role is to choose
whether to stop the construction via an internal transition to qh, which would make it the head of the list,
or to continue as previously described by choosing the path toward qz . In the latter case, vi+1 becomes
an intermediate node qz and loses the pointer to vi, which is overwritten because of the handshake with
the next vi+2. Nevertheless vi will continue to point to vi+1: the pointers of a completed list, therefore,
go from qt to qh. With appropriate reconfigurations to keep only two nodes connected at a time, the
protocol may build lists of arbitrarily length by involving all nodes in the network.
According to Definition 4.1, is indeed a backward list builder for qh, qz , qt and Γ0 on x ∈ [1..r]. By
applying Lemma 4.1, we can finally conclude that Cov(2, 2) is undecidable. ⊓⊔
4.2. Decidability of Cov(∗, 1)
In this section, we will prove that Cov(∗, 1), i.e. the restriction of our coverability problem to processes
with only one field in the message, is PSPACE-complete.
4.2.1. Lower bound for Cov(∗, 1)
We obtain PSPACE-hardness through a reduction from the reachability problem for 1-safe Petri nets.
Proposition 4.1. Cov(∗, 1) is PSPACE-hard.
Proof:
A Petri net N is a tuple N = 〈P, T, ~m0〉, where: P is a finite set of places, T is a finite set of transitions
t such that •t and t• are multisets of places (pre- and post-conditions of t), and ~m0 is a multiset of places
that indicates how many tokens are located in each place in the initial net marking. Given a marking ~m,
the firing of a transition t such that •t ⊆ ~m leads to a new marking ~m′ obtained as ~m′ = ~m \• t ∪ t•.
A Petri net P is 1-safe if in every reachable marking every place has at most one token. Reachability of
a marking ~m1 from the initial marking ~m0 is decidable for Petri nets, and PSPACE-complete for 1-safe
nets [8].
Given a 1-safe net N = 〈P, T, ~m0〉 and a marking ~m1, we encode the reachability problem into
Cov(|N |, 1). We will assume that P = {p1, . . . , pr} and that p1 is the unique place such that ~m0(p1) =
1 and pr the only place such that ~m1(pr) = 1 (without lost of generality we can in fact reduce the
reachability problem of 1-safe net into such a simple case). We now explain how to simulate the behavior
of N with a (r, 1)-protocol P = 〈Q,R, q0〉. The protocol P contains two control states full and empty
from which the only possible action is the broadcast of a message containing the value stored in the first
register. This is depicted in Figure 5. We see that nodes in state empty will always broadcast messages
of type α and nodes of type full will always broadcast messages of type β, and each of these messages
contains the value of the first register which will never be overwritten (and hence will correspond to the
identifier of the node). Then for each transition t ∈ T with •t = {pi1 , . . . , pik} and t
• = {pj1 , . . . , pjl}
empty full
b(α, 1) b(β, 1)
Figure 5. Encoding the nodes of type full and empty
(with i1, . . . , ik, j1, . . . , jl ∈ [1..r]), we will have in P the transitions depicted in Figure 6. Basically, a
node in state q1 will first begin to test whether it has identifiers of nodes of type full in its register i1 to
ik, then it will put in these registers identifiers of nodes of type empty to simulate the consumption of
tokens in the associated places (by receiving messages of type α) and finally it will store identifiers of
nodes of type full in its registers j1 to jl to simulate the production of tokens in the associated places.
Finally, the Figure 7 shows how the simulation begin from the initial state q0, first nodes can go in states
q1
r(β, ?i1)





Figure 6. Encoding transition t with •t = {pi1 , . . . , pik} and t
• = {pj1 , . . . , pjl}
full or empty by broadcasting a message that no one will receive and then a node can go to state q1 by
receiving a message sent by a node full and it will store the identifier in the first register, this to simulate
that the initial marking of N is the one with one token in p1. Finally, a node will go in state end if there
is an identifier of a node of type full in the f -th register. One can then easily prove that the protocol P
verifies the property that ~m1 is reachable from ~m0 in N if and only if there exists γ ∈ Reach(P) such









Figure 7. Initialization of the simulation and ending of the simulation of the 1-safe net
4.2.2. Upper bound for Cov(∗, 1)
We now provide a PSPACE algorithm for solving Cov(∗, 1). The algorithm is based on a saturation
procedure that computes a symbolic representation of reachable configurations. The representation is
built using graphs that keep track of control states that may appear during a protocol execution and of
relations between values in their registers. The set of symbolic configurations we consider is finite and
each symbolic configuration can be encoded in polynomial space.
Symbolic configurations. Assume a (r, 1)-protocol P = 〈Q,R, q0〉 over Σ. A symbolic configuration
θ for P is a labelled graph 〈W, δ, λ〉 where W is a set of nodes, δ ⊆ W × [1..r] × [1..r] ×W is the set
of labelled edges and λ : W 7→ Q× {0, 1}r is a labeling function (as for configurations, we will denote
λQ [resp. λM ] the projection of λ to its first [resp. second] component) such that the following rules are
respected:
• For w,w′ ∈ W , w 6= w′ implies λQ(w) 6= λQ(w
′), i.e. there cannot be two nodes with the same
control state;
• If (w, a, b, w′) ∈ δ then λM (w)[a] = 1 or λM (w
′)[b] = 1 (or both);
• For w ∈ W and j ∈ [1..r], if λM (w)[j] = 1 then (w, j, j, w) ∈ δ.
The labels {0, 1}r are redundant (they can be derived from edges) but simplify some of the constructions
needed in the algorithm. We denote by Θ the set of symbolic configurations for P .
The intuition behind symbolic configuration is the following: a concrete configuration γ belongs to
the denotation JθK of θ if for any node of γ there is a node in θ labelled with the same control states.
Furthermore, for a pair of nodes v1 and v2 in γ containing the same value in registers a and b, respectively,
θ must contain nodes labelled with the corresponding states and an edge labelled with (a, b) connecting
them. Finally, if there are two nodes v in γ labelled with the state q and with the same value in register
j, then there must be a node w in θ with state q and λM (w)[j] = 1.
We now formalize this intuition. Let θ = 〈W, δ, λ〉 be a symbolic configuration for P . Then,
〈V,E, L〉 ∈ JθK iff the following conditions are satisfied:
1. For each v ∈ V , there is a node w ∈ W such that LQ(v) = λQ(w), i.e. v and w have the same
control state;
2. For each v 6= v′ ∈ V , if there exist registers j, j′ ∈ [1..r] s.t. LM (v)[j] = LM (v
′)[j′], i.e., two
distinct nodes with the same value in a pair of registers, then there exists an edge (w, j, j′, w′) ∈ δ
with λQ(w) = LQ(v) and λQ(w
′) = LQ(v
′), i.e. we store possible relations on data in registers
using edges in θ;
3. For each v ∈ V , if there exist j 6= j′ ∈ [1..r] s.t. LM (v)[j] = LM (v)[j
′], i.e. a node with the same
value in two distinct registers, then there exists a self loop (w, j, j′, w) ∈ δ with λQ(w) = LQ(v).
We remark that we do not include any information on the communication links of γ, indeed reconfigu-
ration steps can change the topology in an arbitrary way. We define the initial symbolic configuration
θ0 = 〈{w0}, ∅, λ0〉 with λ0(w0) = (q0,~0). Clearly, we have Jθ0K = Γ0, i.e. the set of concrete configu-
rations represented by θ0 is the set of initial configurations of the protocol P .
Computing symbolically the successors. In order to perform a symbolic reachability on symbolic
configurations, we define a symbolic post operator POSTP that, by working on a symbolic configuration
θ simulates the effect of the application of a broadcast rule on its instances JθK. We illustrate the key
points underlying its definition with the help of an example. Consider the symbolic configurations θ1
and θ2 in Figure 8, where we represent edges (w, a, b, w
′) ∈ δ with arrows from w to w′ labelled by a, b.
Please note that, even though we use directed edges for the graphical representation, the relation between
nodes in W symmetrical as (w, a, b, w′) ∈ δ is equivalent to (w′, b, a, w).
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Figure 8. Example of computations of symbolic post
θ1 denotes configurations with any number of nodes with label q0 or q1. Nodes in state q0 must
have registers containing distinct data (label 0, 0). Nodes in state q1 may have the same value in their
second register (label 0, 1 is equivalent to edge 〈q1, 2, 2, q1〉), that in turn may be equal to the value of
the first register in a node labelled q0 (edge 〈q0, 1, 2, q1〉). θ1 can be obtained from the initial symbolic
configuration by applying rules like 〈q0,b(α, 1), q0〉 and 〈q0, r(α, ↓2), q1〉. Indeed, in q0 we can send the
value of the first register to other nodes in q0 that can then move to q1 and store the data in the second
register (i.e. we create a potential data relation between the first and second register).
We now give examples of rules that can generate the symbolic configuration θ2 starting from θ1.
The pair 〈q0,b(β, 1), q0〉 and 〈q0, r(β, ↓1), q0〉 generates a new data relation between nodes in state q0
modelled by changing from 0 to 1 the value of λM (q0)[1]. We remark that a label 1 only says that
registers in distinct nodes may be (but not necessarily) equal.
Consider now the reception rule 〈q1, r(β, ?2), q2〉 for the same message β. The data relation between
nodes in state q0 and q1 in θ1 tells us that the rule is fireable. To model its effect we need to create a new
node with label q2 with data relations between registers expressed by the edges between labels q0, q1 and
q2 in the figure. Due to possible reconfigurations, not all nodes in q1 necessarily react, i.e. θ2 contains
the denotations of θ1.
A rule like 〈q1, r(β, ?2), q3〉 can also be fireable from instances of θ1. Indeed, the message β can
be sent by a node in state q0 that does not satisfy the data relation specified by the edge (1, 2) in θ1,
i.e., the sending node is not the one having the same value in its first register as the node q1 reacting to
the message, hence the guard ?2 could also be satisfied. This leads to a new node with state q3 which
inherits from q1 the constraints on the first register, but whose second register can have the same value
as the second register of nodes in any state.
We will now provide the formal definition of this symbolic post operator POSTP : Θ 7→ Θ that takes
as input a symbolic configuration and compute a symbolic configuration characterizing the successor of
all the configurations represented by the input symbolic configuration following the rules of P . Before
giving the formal definition, we need to introduce another notion over symbolic configurations. Given
two symbolic configurations θ = 〈W, δ, λ〉 and θ′ = 〈W ′, δ′, λ′〉, we define the union of symbolic
configurations θ and θ′, denoted θ ⊔ θ′, as follows: 〈W ′′, δ′′, λ′′〉 = θ ⊔ θ′ iff the following conditions
are respected:
• there exist w′′ ∈ W ′′ with λQ(w
′′) = q iff there exists w ∈ W with λQ(w) = q or there exists
w′ ∈ W ′ with λQ(w) = λ
′′
Q(w
′′) and furthermore for all i ∈ [1..r], λM (w
′′)[i] = 1 if and only if
λM (w)[i] = 1 or λM (w
′)[i] = 1.





1) = q1 and λQ(w
′′
2) = q2 iff there exists (w1, a, b, w2) ∈
δ (with λQ(w1) = q1) and λQ(w2) = q2) or there exists (w
′









The idea is that to build θ ⊔ θ′, we put all the labels present in the symbolic configuration in the result
symbolic configuration and each time we encounter a 1 in a label, it is reported in the union and all the
edges of the two configurations are reported in the union. We have then the following result which makes
the link between the symbolic union and the union on the corresponding concrete configurations.
Lemma 4.2. Let θ, θ′ be two symbolic configurations. We have JθK ∪ Jθ′K ⊆ Jθ ⊔ θ′K.
Proof:
Assume θ = 〈W, δ, λ〉 and θ′ = 〈W ′, δ′, λ′〉. Let γ = 〈V,E, L〉 be in JθK∪Jθ′K. We suppose γ ∈ JθK (the
case γ ∈ Jθ′K can be treated similarly). Let 〈W ′′, δ′′, λ′′〉 = θ⊔θ′. We will show that γ ∈ J〈W ′′, δ′′, λ′′〉K.
We verify each point of the definition of JK.
1. Let v ∈ V , since γ ∈ JθK, there exists w ∈ W such that LQ(v) = λQ(w), by definition of ⊔, there
exists w′′ ∈ W ′′ such that λ′′Q(w
′′) = λQ(w) = LQ(v).
2. Let v, v′ ∈ V with v 6= v′ and let j, j′ ∈ [1..r].Assume LM (v)[j] = LM (v
′)[j′]. Then there exists
(w, j, j′, w′) ∈ δ with λQ(w) = LQ(v) and λQ(w
′) = LQ(v
′) and by definition of ⊔ there exists
(w′′1 , j, j
′, w′′2) ∈ δ
′′ with λQ(w
′′





3. Let v ∈ V and j, j′ ∈ [1..r] with j 6= j′ such that λM (v)[j] = λM (v)[j
′] then there exists
(w, j, j′, w) ∈ δ with λQ(w) = LQ(v) and by definition of ⊔ there exists (w
′′, j, j′, w′′) ∈ δ′′ with
λQ(w
′′) = λQ(w) = LQ(v).
This allows us to conclude that γ ∈ Jθ ⊔ θ′K.
⊓⊔
Algorithm 1 gives the formal definition of the function POSTP : (Q×Send
r,1
Σ ×Q)×Θ 7→ Θ which
take as input a broadcast rule and a symbolic configuration and compute the effect of the broadcast on the
configurations by considering the different receptions of the protocol P . The operator POSTP : Θ 7→ Θ
is then simply the symbolic union of the possible symbolic configurations obtained by applying all the
broadcast rules of P . More formally if P = 〈Q,R, q0〉, then for all symbolic configurations θ we have
POSTP(θ) =
⊔
〈q,b(m,p),q′〉∈R POSTP(〈q,b(m, p), q
′〉, θ).
Before giving the properties of the POSTP operator, we introduce some notations. First we in-
troduce an order on symbolic configurations. Given two symbolic configurations θ = 〈W, δ, λ〉 and
θ′ = 〈W ′, δ′, λ′〉, we say that θ ⊑ θ′ if and only if there exists an injective function h : W 7→ W ′ such
that for all w,w′ ∈ W :
• λQ(w) = λ
′
Q(h(w));
• for all j ∈ [1..r], if λM (w)[j] = 1 then λ
′
M (h(w))[j] = 1;
• if (w, a, b, w′) ∈ δ then (h(w), a, b, h(w′)) ∈ δ′.
In other words, we have θ ⊑ θ′ if there are more nodes in θ′ than in θ and all the labels of θ appears in θ′
as well, and for what concerns the symbolic register valuation, the one of θ′ should ”cover” the one of θ,
i.e. there are more 1 in θ′ than in θ. In the sequel, we will say that two symbolic configurations are equal
if they are equal up to isomorphism. Since the number of symbolic configurations which are pairwise
disjoint is finite (because there is at most |Q| nodes in a symbolic configuration), and by definition of the
JK operator and of ⊑, one can easily prove the following result.
Lemma 4.3. (1) If θ ⊑ θ′ then JθK ⊆ Jθ′K. (2) If there exists an infinite increasing sequence θ0 ⊑ θ1 ⊑
θ2 . . . then there exists i ∈ N s.t. for all j ≥ i, θj = θi.
Using the definition of ⊑, we can state our first property saying any symbolic configurations is
symbolically included in its symbolic successor.
Lemma 4.4. For all symbolic configurations θ, we have θ ⊑ POSTP(θ).
Sketch of proof. Recall that POSTP(θ) =
⊔
〈q,b(m,p),q′〉∈R POSTP(〈q,b(m, p), q
′〉, θ). If we look care-
fully at Algorithm 1, we notice that it only changes 0 to 1 in the label of the nodes of the input symbolic
configuration θ or it adds new edges or new nodes. Hence by definition of the relation ⊑, we have for
all rules 〈q,b(m, p), q′〉 ∈ R, θ ⊑ POSTP(〈q,b(m, p), q
′〉, θ) and using the definition of the operator
⊔ that also do not delete any edges from the symbolic configurations given in input, we deduce that
θ ⊑ POSTP(θ). 
One consequence of these two lemmas is that if we denote POSTiP the function which consists in
applying i times POSTP , then we now that for all symbolic configurations θ, there exists an integer K
such that for all i ≥ K we have POSTiP(θ) = POST
K
P (θ). We denote in the sequel POST
∗
P(θ) the symbolic
configuration POSTKP (θ). Note that each symbolic configuration of the (r, 1)-protocol P is a graph with
at most |Q| nodes and at most |Q|2 ∗ |r|2 edges and hence we need only polynomial space in the size of
the protocol P to compute POST∗P(θ) for a symbolic configuration θ.
Algorithm 1 θ′ = POSTP(〈q,b(m, p), q
′〉, θ)
Require: A broadcast rule 〈q,b(m, p), q′〉 ∈ R and θ = 〈W, δ, λ〉 a symbolic configuration of the (r, 1)-protocol P =
〈Q,R, q0〉
Ensure: θ′ = 〈W ′, δ′, λ′〉
1: W ′ := W , δ′ := δ, λ′ := λ
2: if there exists w ∈ W such that λQ(w) = q then
3: if there does not exist w′ ∈ W ′ such that λ′Q(w
′) = q′ then
4: Create a node w′ ∈ W ′ with λ′Q(w
′) = q′ and λ′M (w
′) := ~0
5: end if
6: Let w′ ∈ W ′ such that λ′Q(w
′) = q′




8: for all (w, a, b, w′′) ∈ δ′, δ′ := δ′ ∪ {(w′, a, b, w′′)}
9: for all (w, a, b, w) ∈ δ′, δ′ := δ′ ∪ {(w′, a, b, w′)}
10: for all 〈q′′, r(m,α), q′′′〉 ∈ R such that there exists w′′ ∈ W with λQ(w
′′) = q′′ do
11: if α = ?k or α = ∗ then
12: if there does not exist w′′′ ∈ W ′ such that λ′Q(w
′′′) = q′′′ then
13: Create a node w′′′ ∈ W ′ with λ′Q(w
′′′) = q′′′ and λ′M (w
′′′) := ~0
14: end if
15: Let w′′′ ∈ W ′ such that λ′Q(w
′′′) = q′′′
16: for all j ∈ [1..r], if λM (w
′′)[j] = 1 then λ′M (w
′′′)[j] := 1
17: for all (w′′, a, b, v) ∈ δ′, δ′ := δ′ ∪ {(w′′′, a, b, v)}
18: for all (w′′, a, b, w′′) ∈ δ′, δ′ := δ′ ∪ {(w′′′, a, b, w′′′)}
19: end if
20: if α = ↓k then
21: if there does not exist w′′′ ∈ W ′ such that λ′Q(w
′′′) = q′′′ then
22: Create a node w′′′ ∈ W ′ with λ′Q(w
′′′) = q′′′ and λ′M (w
′′′) := ~0
23: end if
24: Let w′′′ ∈ W ′ such that λ′Q(w
′′′) = q′′′
25: λM (w
′′′)[k] = 1 and δ′ := δ′ ∪ {(w′, p, k, w′′′), (w′′′, k, k, w′′′)}
26: For all j ∈ [1..r], if λM (w
′′)[j] = 1 then λ′M (w
′′′)[j] := 1
27: if λM (w)[p] = 1, Then for all (w, p, b, v) ∈ δ, δ
′ := δ′ ∪ {(w′′′, k, b, v)}
28: for all (w′′, a, b, v) ∈ δ′ with a 6= k, δ′ := δ′ ∪ {(w′′′, a, b, v)}
29: For all (w′′, a, b, w′′) ∈ δ′ with a 6= k and b 6= k, δ′ := δ′ ∪ {(w′′′, a, b, w′′′)}
30: end if
31: if α = ?k and (w, p, k, w′′) ∈ δ or (w′′, k, p, w) ∈ δ then
32: if there does not exist w′′′ ∈ W ′ such that λ′Q(w
′′′) = q′′′ then
33: Create a node w′′′ ∈ W ′ with λ′Q(w
′′′) = q′′′ and λ′M (w
′′′) := ~0
34: end if
35: Let w′′′ ∈ W ′ such that λ′Q(w
′′′) = q′′′
36: for all j ∈ [1..r], if λM (w
′′)[j] = 1 then λ′M (w
′′′)[j] := 1
37: for all (w′′, a, b, v) ∈ δ′, δ′ := δ′ ∪ {(w′′′, a, b, v)}




Lemma 4.5. Given a symbolic configuration, POST∗P(θ) can be computed in polynomial space in the
size of P .
Given a set of configurations S ⊆ Γ of the (r, 1)-protocol P = 〈Q,R, q0〉 (with BNRA(P) = 〈Γ,⇒
,Γ0〉), we define postP(S) = {γ
′ ∈ Γ | ∃γ ∈ Γ s.t. γ ⇒ γ′} and post∗P is the reflexive and transitive
closure of postP . We will now see how to relate POSTP and postP .
Lemma 4.6. For all symbolic configuration θ, we have postP(JθK) ⊆ JPOSTP(θ)K.
Sketch of proof. We consider a symbolic configuration θ. We recall that by definition POSTP(θ) =
⊔
〈q,b(m,p),q′〉∈R POSTP(〈q,b(m, p), q
′〉, θ). We consider a broadcast rule 〈q,b(m, p), q′〉 and we denote
by postP(〈q,b(m, p), q
′〉, JθK) the set of configurations γ′ that can be obtained by performing a Broad-
cast step in BNRA(P) from a configuration γ in JθK using the broadcast rule 〈q,b(m, p), q′〉. By per-
forming a case analysis on the different reception rules of P , one can show that postP(〈q,b(m, p), q
′〉, JθK)
⊆ JPOSTP(〈q,b(m, p), q






















′〉, JθK) ⊆ JPOSTP(θ)K
Furthermore note that for all γ ∈ JθK and all configurations γ′, if γ ⇒ γ′ and the applied rule is a
Reconfiguration, then we have γ′ ∈ JθK, hence using Lemma 4.4 and the first item of Lemma 4.3, we
deduce that γ′ ∈ JPOSTP(θ)K. Consequently we can conclude that postP(JθK) ⊆ JPOSTP(θ)K. 
From this lemma, we can deduce by an easy induction the following lemma.
Corollary 4.1. For all symbolic configurations θ, we have post∗P(JθK) ⊆ JPOST
∗
P(θ)K.
Ideally, we would like to have that for any symbolic configuration the set JPOSTP(θ)K is included
into post∗P(JθK) because we perform many broadcast in a symbolic step during the computation of the
symbolic post. Unfortunately this is not the case. In fact, consider the symbolic configuration θ1 depicted
in Figure 8. As we explained this symbolic configuration could be equal to POSTP(θ0) (where θ0 is the
initial symbolic configuration containing a single node labelled by 〈q0,~0〉) by considering the rules in P
of the form: 〈q0,b(α, 1), q0〉 and 〈q0, r(α, ↓2), q1〉. Note that the configuration γ containing two nodes
u and v such that LQ(u) = q0, LM (u) = 〈0, 1〉, LQ(v) = q1 and LM (u) = 〈2, 3〉 belongs to Jθ1K
but is not reachable thanks to the according rules, in fact when one node goes from q0 to q1 it should
share in its second register a value with a node labelled by q0. Hence we have γ ∈ JPOSTP(θ0)K and
γ /∈ post∗P(Jθ0K). However we can ”increase” the configuration γ to obtain a bigger configuration γ
′
reachable from an initial configuration and belonging as well to Jθ1K, for instance by adding a node u
′ to
γ such LQ(u
′) = q0 and LM (u
′) = 〈3, 4〉. We now formalize this idea.
We introduce an ordering relation ✂ ⊆ Γ × Γ on concrete configurations defined as follows: given
two configurations γ = 〈V,E, L〉 and γ′ = 〈V ′, E′, L′〉, we have γ ✂ γ′ iff there exists an injective
function h : V 7→ V ′ such that:
• for all v ∈ V , LQ(v) = LQ(h(v));
• for all v, v′ ∈ V and all i, j ∈ [1..r], LM (v)[i] = LM (v
′)[j] if and only if LM (h(v))[i] =
LM (h(v
′))[j].
Note that in the previous example, we have effectively γ✂γ′. By using the definition of the transition
relation ⇒ and of the satisfaction relation |= for reachability query we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.7. Let γ1, γ2 ∈ Γ such that γ1 ✂ γ2. We have then:
1. For all γ′1 ∈ Γ such that γ1 ⇒ γ
′
1, there exists γ
′







2. For all reachability queries ϕ, if γ1 |= ϕ then γ2 |= ϕ.
Furthermore, as shown with the previous example, by using the definition of JK over symbolic con-
figurations and the definition of the symbolic post operator POSTP , we can deduce the following result.
Lemma 4.8. Let θ be a symbolic configuration. For all γ ∈ JPOSTP(θ)K, there exists γ
′ ∈ post∗P(JθK)∩
JPOSTP(θ)K such that γ ✂ γ
′.
These two last lemmas allow us to obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2. Let θ be a symbolic configuration. For all γ ∈ JPOST∗P(θ)K, there exists γ
′ ∈ post∗P(JθK)
such that γ ✂ γ′.
Proof:
We will prove that for all n ∈ N, for all γ ∈ JPOSTnP(θ)K, there exists γ
′ ∈ post∗P(JθK) such that
γ ✂ γ′. We reason by induction on n. First in the case n = 0, the property holds trivially (we recall that
POSTnP(θ) = θ). Now assume the property holds for n ∈ N and we will show it is still true for n + 1.




JPOSTn+1P (θ)K such that γ ✂ γ
′. Hence there exists γ1 ∈ JPOST
n
P(θ)K such that γ1 ⇒ . . . ⇒ γ
′. By
induction hypothesis, there exist γ2 ∈ post
∗
P(JθK) such that γ1 ✂ γ2. But then thanks the first item of
Lemma 4.7, since γ1 ✂ γ2 and γ1 ⇒ . . . ⇒ γ
′ we deduce that there exists γ′2 such that γ2 ⇒ . . . ⇒ γ
′
2






P(JθK) and since γ ✂ γ
′ and γ′ ✂ γ′2, we
also have γ ✂ γ′2. ⊓⊔
Evaluating a reachability query symbolically. We now define how to evaluate a reachability query
over a symbolic configuration . Let θ = 〈W, δ, λ〉 be a symbolic configuration and ϕ be a reachability
query. We denote by Vars(ϕ) the subset of variables used in the query ϕ and we assume that ϕ =
∧
k∈[1..m] ϕk where for each k ∈ [1..m], ϕk is of the form q(z) or Mi(z) = Mj(z
′) or Mi(z) 6= Mj(z
′).
We will then say that θ |= ϕ if there exists a function g : Vars(ϕ) 7→ W such that for all k ∈ [1..m]
we have the following properties: if ϕk = q(z), then λQ(g(z)) = q; if ϕk = (Mi(z) = Mj(z
′)) with
z 6= z′ or i 6= j, then (g(z), i, j, g(z′)) ∈ δ. We have then the following lemma.
Lemma 4.9. Given a symbolic configuration θ and a reachability query ϕ, we have θ |= ϕ if and only if
there exists γ ∈ JθK such that γ |= ϕ.
We can now state the main result about the symbolic post operator.
Lemma 4.10. Let θ be a symbolic configuration of the protocol P . Then we have for all reachability




Let θ be a symbolic configuration of the protocol P . Let ϕ be a reachability query. First assume that
there exists γ ∈ post∗P(JθK) such that γ |= ϕ, then by Corollary 4.1 we know that γ ∈ POST
∗
P(θ). By
Lemma 4.9, we deduce that POST∗P(θ) |= ϕ. Assume now that POST
∗
P(θ) |= ϕ. By Lemma 4.9, there
exists γ ∈ JPOST∗P(θ)K such that γ |= ϕ. By Corollary 4.2, there exists γ
′ ∈ post∗P(JθK) such that γ✂γ
′.
Using the second item of Lemma 4.7, we obtain that γ′ |= ϕ. ⊓⊔
We have consequently an algorithm to solve whether there exists γ ∈ Reach(P) = post∗P(Γ0). In fact it
is enough to compute POST∗P(θ0) and to check whether POST
∗
P(θ) |= ϕ. This computation is feasible in
polynomial space thanks to Lemma 4.5. Finally we can check in non-deterministic linear time whether
POST∗P(θ0) |= ϕ (it is enough to guess the function g from Vars(ϕ) to the nodes of POST
∗
P(θ0)). Using
Lemma 4.10, this gives us a polynomial space procedure to check whether there exists γ ∈ Reach(P)
such that γ |= ϕ. Furthermore, thanks to the lower bound given by Proposition 4.1, we can deduce the
exact complexity of coverability for protocols using a single field in their messages.
Theorem 4.2. Cov(∗, 1) is PSPACE-complete.
5. Fully Connected Topologies and No Reconfiguration
5.1. Undecidability of Cov fc(2, 1)
We now move to coverability in fully connected topologies. In contrast with the results obtained without
identifiers in [15] it turns out that, without reconfiguration, coverability is undecidable already in the
case of nodes with two registers and one payload field. We define a (forward) list-builder protocol,
which builds lists backwards from the tail qt. At each step, a node v among the ones which are not part
of the list broadcasts its identifier to the others (which store the value, thus pointing to v), and moves to
qz (or qt, if it is the first step) electing itself as the next node in the list. The construction ends when such
a node will instead move to qh and force everyone else to stop. By applying Lemma 4.1, the following
theorem then holds.
Theorem 5.1. Cov fc(2, 1) is undecidable even when one register is read-only.
Proof:
We now show that the protocol Pfclb in Figure 9 is a list builder for ⇒b and Γ
fc
0 on x and states qh, qz , qt
(where the lists are built backwards from qt). Let γ0 = 〈V,E, L〉 ∈ Γ
fc
0 be an initial configuration. As
soon as a node v ∈ V decides to start the construction of the list, it broadcasts its identifier to every other










Figure 9. Pfclb : list builder for 〈qh, qz, qt〉 and fully connected configurations on x
message: after the transition we get a configuration γ1 ∈ Γ such that v is the only node in state qt while
any other node u ∈ V \ {v} is in state q1 and points to v via x.
The processes labelled by q1 may build a list of arbitrary length by electing one qz node at a time.
The communication pattern for handling message b(zero, id) is the same as before, therefore the same
reasoning applies: at each step, all of the nodes in state q1 have their local register x pointing to the newly
elected node z ∈ V in state qz (or to v if it is the first qz), and z is excluded from the list construction
from now on. As soon as a node h ∈ V switches to qh, every remaining process moves to qhalt: exactly
one list has been built, and the protocol has to stop. According to Definition 4.1, Pfclb is therefore a
forward 〈qh, qz, qt〉-list builder for ⇒b and Γ
fc
0 on x. Since it also has a read-only register id, we can
conclude that Cov fc(2, 1) is undecidable thanks to Lemma 4.1.
⊓⊔
5.2. Decidability of Cov fc(1, 1)
We now consider the problem Cov fc(1, 1), where configurations are fully connected and do not change
dynamically, processes have a single register, and each message has a single data field. To show de-
cidability, we employ the theory of well-structured transition systems [1, 21] to define an algorithm for
backward reachability based on a symbolic representation of infinite set of configurations, namely mul-
tisets of multisets of states in Q. In the following we use [a1, . . . , ak] to denote a multiset containing
(possibly repeated) occurrences a1, . . . , ak of elements from some fixed domain. For a multiset m, we
use m(q) to denote the number of occurrences of q in m.
In the sequel we consider a (1, 1)-protocol P = 〈Q,R, q0〉. The set Ξ of symbolic configurations
contains, for every k ∈ N, all multisets of the form ξ = [m1, . . . ,mk], where mi for i ∈ [1..k] is in turn
a multiset over Q. Given ξ = [m1, . . . ,mk] ∈ Ξ, 〈V,E, L〉 ∈ JξK iff there is a function f : V → [1..k]
such that (1) for every v, v′ ∈ V , if LM (v) = LM (v
′) then f(v) = f(v′) and (2) for all i ∈ [1..k] and
q ∈ Q, mi(q) is equal to the number of nodes v ∈ V s.t. f(v) = i and LQ(v) = q. Intuitively, each mi
is associated to one of the k distinct values of the register (the actual values do not matter), and mi(q)
counts how many nodes in state q have the corresponding value. We now define an ordering over Ξ.
Definition 5.1. Given ξ = [m1, . . . ,mk] ∈ Ξ and ξ
′ = [m′1, . . . ,m
′
p] ∈ Ξ, ξ ≺ ξ
′ iff k ≤ p and there
exists an injection h : [1..k] → [1..p] such that for all i ∈ [1..k] and all q ∈ Q, mi(q) ≤ mh(i)(q), i.e.
mi is included in mh(i).
The following properties then hold.
Proposition 5.1. The ordering (ξ,≺) over symbolic configurations is a well-quasi ordering (wqo), i.e.
for any infinite sequence ξ1ξ2 . . . there exist i < j s.t. ξi ≺ ξj .
Proof:
By Dickson’s Lemma, we know that, for multisets over a finite set Q, multiset inclusion is a wqo. By
Higman’s Lemma, for multisets built over a wqo domain, multiset inclusion (in which elements are
compared using the wqo) is still a wqo. Thus, the juxtaposition of the two orderings yields a well-quasi
ordering. ⊓⊔
We now exhibit an algorithm PREP that works on symbolic representations in Ξ of configurations of net-
works with one register x in each node and one data field in each message. For a symbolic configuration
ξ = [m1, . . . ,mk], mi is a multiset over Q for i ∈ [1, . . . , k]. The representation allows us to maintain
the minimal information about relations (= and 6=) over data and forget about specific values of the data
and minimal constraints on the number of nodes (sharing the same value) in each state in Q. For S ⊆ Γ,
we define preP(S) as the set {γ | γ ⇒b γ
′ and γ′ ∈ S} The following proposition then holds.
Proposition 5.2. There exists an algorithm PREP that takes in input I ⊆ Ξ and returns a set I
′ ⊆ Ξ s.t.
JI ′K = preP(JIK).
To prove the proposition, in the rest of the section we define the algorithm PREP . The algorithm that
computes PREP computes minimal representations of predecessors by applying backwards broadcast





where B = (Q× Send1,1Σ ×Q) ∩R is the set of all broadcast actions. Furthermore,




We focus our attention on PREb for a given broadcast b and a given symbolic configuration ξ. In the rest
of the section we assume that
• b = 〈q,b(msg, p1), q
′〉,
• ξ = [m1, . . . ,mk] where each multiset mi of symbols in Q is associated to a distinct value for
register x;
To symbolically compute predecessors, we recall that a configuration ξ = [m1, . . . ,mk] denotes the
infinite set of multisets of the form γ = [m′1, . . . ,m
′
k,mk+1, . . . ,mr] where, in turn, mi is a sub-
multiset of m′i for i ∈ [1..k]. These kind of configurations are obtained either by adding either nodes
with identifiers equal to those already present in ξ (e.g. when m′i is strictly larger than mi) or by adding
nodes with fresh identifiers (the additional multisets mk+1, . . . ,mr).
We recall that reception rules in R have four possible types of action ?p1, ?p1, ↓p1, and ∗. For
a reception rule of the shape r = 〈qi, r(msg, α), q
′
i〉 with α ∈ {?p1, ?p1, ↓p1, ∗} we call qi [q
′
i ] the
precondition [resp. postcondition] of the rule r.
To illustrate the rationale behind our construction of PREb, we first illustrate the key ideas with the
help of an example.
Example 5.1. Consider a symbolic configuration ξ = [m1,m2], where m1 = [q2, r2, u2] and m2 =
[v2, v2] represent two groups of nodes s.t. m1 contains at least three processes with the same value c1 in
the register and m2 contains at least two processes with the same value c2 in the register.
Consider now the rules: 〈q1,b(a, 1), q2〉, 〈r1, r(a, ?1), r2〉, 〈u1, r(a, ↓1), u2〉, and 〈v1, r(a, ?1), v2〉.
We assume that the sender is the node in state q2 in m1. Its precondition is then the state q1. We now
have to consider reactions. We first consider the nodes in m1 (same identifier as the sender) with state r2
and u2. Each node matches a postcondition of a test or store rule. However, for each of them there are
two cases to consider: they either reacted to the current broadcast or they reached their state in a previous
step. Thus the precondition for r2 can be either r1 or r2 itself. Both preconditions must remain in the
same group. For u2 we have to be more careful. The precondition can be either u1 or u2. However, since
the value of the register before store is unknown, they can either remain in the same group, move to other
existing groups in ξ, or to newly created groups (associated to fresh identifiers). Similarly, the precon-
ditions for nodes in state v2 can be either v1 or v2. These processes remain in the same group. Among
the predecessors we have then symbolic configurations like: [[q1, r1, u1], [v1, v1]], [[q1, r1, u1], [v1, v2]],
[[q1, r1, u1], [v2, v2]], [[q1, r2, u2], [v1, v1]], [[q1, r1], [u1, v1, v1]], [[q1, r1], [v1, v1], [u1]], etc.
To take into account the upward closure of the denotations of ξ, we also have to consider possible
extensions of ξ with additional nodes that match postconditions of send and receive rules. For instance,
we may assume that there exists another node in state q1 in m2, and then recompute predecessors start-
ing from [[q2, r2, u2], [q2, v2, v2]] or assume that there exist a node with a fresh value with postcondition
q2 and then compute the predecessors from [[q2, r2, u2], [v2, v2], [q2]], and so on. Similarly we have to
consider possible extensions of ξ with matching postconditions of reception rules and computed prede-
cessors for them too. Luckily, we have to consider only finitely many extensions since we are interested
in computing minimal configurations only. Specifically, extensions of ξ with more than one occurrence
of the same postcondition will lead to non-minimal configurations, and thus they can be avoided.
All the predecessor symbolic configurations are then collected together and only the minimal one
w.r.t. ≺ form the basis of the symbolic representation of predecessor configurations.
To simplify the presentation, we present a non-deterministic algorithm to compute PREb(ξ) defined
via a case analysis on broadcast and receptions. The algorithm can be transformed into a deterministic
one by exploring all possible alternatives. Consider the broadcast rule b = 〈q,b(msg, p1), q
′〉 and the
symbolic configuration ξ = [m1, . . . ,mk]. We recall that ξ denotes all configurations larger than ξ
w.r.t. ≺. However, to compute predecessors it is enough to consider extensions of ξ with at most one
occurrence of a sender process. Adding explicit representations of receivers is not necessary since the
corresponding predecessors would produce non minimal representations. This is due to the fact that
update of receiver states do not influence the state of other processes.
In what follows, the operator ⊕ denotes the multiset union. We first define the finite set of possible
extensions of ξ as follows:
Extq′(ξ) = {ξ} ∪ {ξ ⊕ [q
′]} ∪ {[m1, . . . ,mi ⊕ [q
′], . . . ,mk] | i ∈ [1, k]}
The intuition behinds this extension is that we have to consider the configuration in JξK where the state q′
appears since these are the configuration we will get after taking the broadcast rule b = 〈q,b(msg, p1), q
′〉.
For each ξ′ ∈ Extq′(ξ), we will show how to compute a set of symbolic predecessor. Let ξ
′ ∈
Extq′(ξ) with ξ
′ = [m1, . . . ,mk]. We can now assume now that mi = [q
′] ⊕ m for some i. We first
notice that ξ′ has no predecessors if there are states that correspond to preconditions of receptions of
msg that could be fired with b, unless receptions preserve the state with a loop on q′. Indeed, since the
topology is fully connected all nodes must react to the broadcast b (i.e. a precondition state of a reception
cannot remain in the current state unless the reception does not change it). Let us assume now that the
previous case does not apply. We will give now the way to obtain set of predecessors of ξ of the shape
[m′1, . . . ,m
′
ℓ] with ℓ ≥ k.
To define m′i we first non-deterministically decompose m into the multisets w1, w2, w3, w4, where
w1 contains target states of receptions for msg with action ?p1, w2 contains target states of receptions
for msg with action ∗, w3 contains target states of receptions for msg with action ↓p1, and w4 contains
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To multiset pre(ui) is defined by case analysis on receptions.
• For rules with test and ignore action pre(ui), i ∈ [1, 2], is obtained by replacing each occurrence of
a postcondition with the corresponding precondition of a (non deterministically selected) reception
rule for msg (i.e pre(ui) and ui have the same size).
• For rules with store actions, pre(u3) is obtained by first replacing each occurrence of a postcon-
dition in u3 with the corresponding precondition of a (non deterministically selected) reception
rule for msg, and then by non-deterministically splitting the resulting multiset into two multisets,
namely pre(u3) and pre 6=(u3). The latter processes correspond to processes with register values
distinct from those in m.
We will then have m′i = [q]⊕m
′.
We now have to generate the multiset m′j associated to the multisets mj with j ∈ [1..k] \ {i}. To
compute m′j we consider reception rules that either have ?p1 (i.e. the value in the register is distinct from
the sender) or ∗ action. We non-deterministically split mj in
mj = uj ⊕ vj
so that uj contains postcondition states of receptions of msg, and compute m
′
j by applying reception
backwards to uj , i.e.,
m′j = pre(uj)⊕ vj
Finally, the multiset pre 6=(u3) is non-deterministically distributed among the multisets m
′
j with j 6= i or
used to add to the resulting configuration additional multisets (all possible splittings of sub multisets of
pre 6=(u3)). In the former case the processes in pre 6=(u3) correspond to processes with register values
that were already present in ξ′. In the latter case they correspond to processes whose register value is
fresh with respect to those in ξ′.
When we have computing sets of symbolic predecessors for each ξ′ ∈ Extq′(ξ), we take for PREb(ξ)
the minimal set I of symbolic representations representing the union of all the computed sets and which
is obtained by by removing redundant representations and representations that are larger than others.
5.3. Decision Procedure
Following [3], the algorithm for PREP can be used to effectively compute a finite representation of the
set of predecessors pre∗P(JBadK) for a set of symbolic configurations Bad. The computation iteratively
applies PREP until a fixpoint is reached. The termination test is defined using ≺. The wqo ≺ ensures
termination of the computation [1]. The following theorem then holds.
Theorem 5.2. Cov fc(1, 1) is decidable.
Proof:
We show how to apply the symbolic predecessor computation based on PREP . Let ϕ be a query with set
of variables Z. The (in)equalities in ϕ induce a finite set P1, . . . , Pk of partitions of Z. Each partition
Pi = {X
i
1, . . . , X
i
ui
} is such that Xij contains variables that may take the same value (i.e. there are
no 6= constraints between them in ϕ). For a partition X , we define the multiset mX of symbols in Q
for which there exists a predicate q(z) with z ∈ X . Thus Pi = {X
i
1, . . . , X
i
ui
} can be represented via
the multiset of multisets si = [mXi
1
, . . . ,mXiui
]. The set I = {s1, . . . , sk} corresponds to the minimal
elements of the set of configurations that satisfy ϕ. To apply the algorithm we set Bad = I↑, i.e.,
I = min(Bad). We compute then the least fixpoint of PREP , say PRE
∗
P(I). To check if the resulting
set of symbolic configurations contains an initial state, we need to search for a finite basis 〈V, L,E〉
(where E = V × V \ {(v, v) | v ∈ V }) in which all nodes have initial states as labels, and in which
there cannot be two nodes with the same value in the register (initially all processes have distinct values
in local registers). Using the multiset representation, we need to search for a multiset consisting of
multisets of the form [q0] where q0 is the initial state of the protocol, i.e. coverability holds if and only if
[[q0], . . . , [q0]] ∈ PRE
∗
P(I). ⊓⊔
An alternative proof can be given by resorting to an encoding into coverability in data nets [25]. We
present such an encoding in [13]. We did not investigate the reverse translation, i.e. whether data nets
can be encoded into our model with fully-connected topology, one register and one-field per message,
but due to the expressive power of data nets, it seems that it would be difficult to get such a reduction.
We consider now the complexity. We observe that, without registers and fields our model boils down
to the AHNs of [15]. For fully connected topologies, AHN can simulate reset nets as shown in [16]
and hence the parameterized coverability problem for such a model is Akcermann-hard. In fact, this
can be deduced from the fact that the complexity of coverability in reset nets is Ackermann-hard [28].
Furthermore it has been show later that for fully connected topology, the parameterized coverability
problem in AHN is in fact Ackermann-complete [27]. Following these results, we obtain the following
theoretical lower bound.
Corollary 5.1. Cov fc(0, 0) and Cov fc(1, 1) are Ackermann-hard.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we investigated decidability and complexity for parameterized verification of a formal model
of distributed computation based on register automata communicating via broadcast messages with data.
The results we obtained are summarized in Table 1 where we recall that r stands for the number of
registers present in each node of the network and f characterizes the number of fields allowed in the
messages of the protocol. As already mentioned, for r = 0 and f = 0 the parameterized coverability
problem had already been studied previously. From a technical point of view, our results can be viewed
as a fine grained refinement of those obtained for the case without data. For instance, undecidability
follows from constructions similar to those adopted in [15]. They are based on special use of data for
building synchronization patterns that can be applied even in fully connected networks. We point out
the fact that we have characterize exhaustively the decidability status of the parameterized coverability
problem for Broadcast Networks of Register Automata since as mentioned before it does not make sense
to consider more data fields in the message than number of registers in the nodes. The only problem left
open is the precise complexity characterization of Cov fc(1, 1).
Protocol
Problem r f Complexity
Cov(r, f) 0 0 PTIME[14]
r ≥ 1 1 PSPACE-complete [Thm. 4.2]
r ≥ 2 f ≥ 2 Undecidable [Thm 4.1]
Cov fc(r, f) 0 0 Ackermann-complete [16, 27]
1 1 Decidable and Ackermann-hard [Thm 5.2]
r ≥ 2 f ≥ 1 Undecidable [Thm. 5.1]
Cov b(r, f) r ≥ 0 f ≥ 0 Undecidable [15]
Table 1. Decidability and complexity boundaries
In our model, we have assumed that in an initial configuration the same data is not present twice
(in any register). One could easily verify that for the cases where we obtain decidability (for Cov(∗, 1)
and Cov fc(1, 1)), the same techniques can be applied if we relax this hypothesis and hence we would
obtain the same decidability results with the same complexity. For the cases where we have proved
undecidability (Cov(2, 2) and Cov fc(2, 1)), we can observe that we need in our undecidability proofs
one read-only register containing a different identifier for each node of the network. Hence if we relax
two much the hypothesis on the initial configurations (such that nodes cannot be anymore distinguished
through this register) it is not clear whether the problems will remain undecidable or not.
Finally, in this work, we have considered only safety properties for our model, but as we mention
with the example provided in Section 3, it would be interested to investigate liveness property that states
that eventually something desired happens. For the cases of fully connected topologies in which we
rely on the theory of well-structured transition systems, positive results might be difficult to obtain since
backward algorithms, as the one we use for Cov fc(1, 1), will not apply, but for the case with reconfigura-
tion with one register and one field per message it might be easier. We plan to investigate such problems
in future works. Another possible direction for future research would be to see what happens when the
data are ordered. It would be also interesting to understand how such techniques can be applied to real
protocols by analyzing for instance approximate executions (our model being not expressive enough to
characterize precisely the behaviors of a concrete protocols). In fact to verify the behaviors of concrete
protocols with our method, we would need to abstract away some aspects of the protocols in order to be
able to encode them in our model. One negative point is that such methods might lead to false alarms
(bugs in the approximation which cannot occur in the real protocols) and an idea left also as possible
direction of research could then be to provide a way to refine the abstraction in order to discard such
wrong executions.
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